Buffalo Law Review
Volume 22

Number 2

Article 9

1-1-1973

Administrative Law—Expansive Discretion Allowed Executive
Branch in Admission of Politically Disfavored Aliens.
Susan Ginsberg

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the
Immigration Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Susan Ginsberg, Administrative Law—Expansive Discretion Allowed Executive Branch in Admission of
Politically Disfavored Aliens., 22 Buff. L. Rev. 499 (1973).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol22/iss2/9

This Recent Case is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

RECENT CASES
ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-ExPANSrivE

DISCRETION

ALLOWED

EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN ADMISSION OF POLITICALLY DISFAVORED ALIENS.

Ernest Mandel, a Belgian citizen, is a journalist, author, and an
advocate of the economic, governmental and international doctrines
of world communism. Invited to participate in a conference at Stanford-and incidentally to visit several major American universitiesMandel applied for a visa in September 1969. He had visited the
United States twice before on temporary nonimmigrant visas, both
times after a finding of ineligibility under sections 212 (a) (28) (D),
and (G) (v) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 19521 and a
subsequent grant of a waiver by the Attorney General.2 These provisions establish ineligibility for admission to the United States and denial of visas to certain harmful aliens; among them are certain advocates of communism, a class of which Mandel is admittedly a member.
Because Mandel "engaged in activities beyond the stated purposes of
1. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1970) [hereinafter
referred to as Immigration Act]. The statute provides in relevant part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of
aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission
into the United States:
(28) Aliens who are, or at any time have been, members of any of the following
classes:
(D) Aliens not within any of the other provisions of this paragraph
who advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of
world communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship ....
(G) Aliens who write or publish ... (v) the economic, international, and
governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the
United States of a totalitarian dictatorship ....
2. Such a waiver is provided for in section 212(d) (3) of the Immigration Act,
which states:
(d) Except as provided in this subsection, an alien (A) who is applying for
a nonimmigrant visa and is known or believed by the consular officer to be ineligible for such visa under one or more of the paragraphs enumerated in
subsection (a) . . . may, after approval by the Attorney General of a recommendation by the Secretary of State or by the consular officer that the alien be
admitted temporarily despite his inadmissibility, be granted such a visa and
may be admitted into the United States temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the
discretion of the Attorney General ....
Immigration Act § 212(d) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (3) (1970).
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his trip" on his second visit in 1968, he was presently denied a waiver
of ineligibility.8 Evidence indicated that these activities consisted of his
acceptance of more speaking engagements than his visa application had
specified and his presence at a meeting in which funds were solicited for
the legal defense of students who had participated in demonstrations. In
response to these charges, Mandel claimed ignorance of any limitation
upon the number of lectures permitted or restraints upon his attendance at such meetings, and alleged that he had not participated in the
fund raising.
After the visa application was denied, the State Department learned
that Mandel may indeed have been unaware of the restrictions on his
earlier visit, and therefore recommended that the Attorney General
waive the statutory ineligibility. The recommendation was rejected
and Mandel was informed that his visa had been refused because his 1968 activities "represented a flagrant abuse of the opportu4
nities afforded him to express his views in this country."
Mandel and eight United States citizens who had invited him to
speak and were prevented from participating in the planned academic
exchange subsequently brought suit in federal district court. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the exclusion by the Attorney
General and the Secretary of State was unconstitutional, and an injunction to compel the granting of the visa. A three-judge panel enjoined the enforcement of section 212 (a) (28), holding that the infringement of appellants' right to hear and freely discuss ideas, as protected under the first amendment, was not outweighed by the protection
of interests within the governmental sphere of concern. Since the sole
effect of the statute in this case was to restrain the entry of disfavored
political doctrine it was invalidated by the first amendment.5
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the lower
court. Held: when the Attorney General decides, for any "facially
legitimate and bona fide" reason, to refuse waiver of ineligibility, the
Court will not review his judgment upon the complaint of those who
were prevented from the exchange of ideas with the alien. Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 19520 and its preceding
3.
instant
4.
5.

Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 758 n.5 (1972)
case].
Id. at 759.
Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).

6. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 etseq. (1970).

[hereinafter cited as
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legislation have been particularly attentive to the regulation of political dissidents-first anarchists and more recently Communist-associated individuals.7 The principle upon which this control rests is a
fundamental one: inherent in its sovereignty is a nation's power of
self-preservation, and the exclusion of unwanted aliens is basic to that
power.8 The Supreme Court has uniformly refrained from interfering
with Congress and the executive in cases involving deportations and
admissions of aliens on the assumption that such cases relate to national
security and the conduct of foreign affairs. 9 Even in a case in which a
resident alien has claimed a violation of equal protection and due
process, the Court has held that Congress has plenary power to formulate standards for the exclusion of aliens; 10 admission is not a right, but
a privilege granted only upon such terms as Congress provides." Since
this plenary power is understood to be constitutionally allocated to the
executive for reasons of national security and foreign relations, the
Court characteristically engages in the process of balancing those interests against the injury to the individual's rights.' 2 In Jay v. Boyd,' 8
the Court, in a five-to-four decision, upheld the Attorney General's deportation of a resident alien even though the decision was based on
secret information which the alien was not permitted to refute. Although it affirmed the executive's broad discretionary power, the Court
did attempt to elucidate the criterion which must be used: the Attorney General has properly exercised his discretion if "the disclosure
of the information would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety,
or security."' 4 The question of how the Court would deal with asserted first amendment rights of American citizens in conflict with an
alien exclusion statute had not been determined prior to the instant
case.
7. Instant case at 761-62.
8. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581
(1889).
9. "[I]t is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law,
to review the determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude a
given alien." United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950);
accord, Oetien v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). The Japanese Immigrant
Case, Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
10. Galvanv. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
11. Jayv. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
13. 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
14. Id. at 358.
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The statutory scheme under which Mandel's visa was denied mechanically excludes all members of particular alien classes.16 Section
212 (d) (3) enables the Attorney General to grant, at his discretion, a
waiver of ineligibility in certain cases. 16 It is clear that Congress may
delegate its power to exclude aliens. However, Congress is not free to
delegate unlimited power, for its own power is "to regulat[e] by treaty
or by act. . except so far as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the paramount law of the
Constitution to intervene."' Under the Administrative Procedure Act,
an aggrieved party's 8 right to judicial review is presumed unless explicitly denied by statute or unless Congressional intent to eliminate
review is otherwise apparent. 19 It appears from the structure of the exclusion statute that Congress provided for the treatment of harmless
aliens in Mandel's category by inclusion of the waiver provision which
was intended to allow admission when dictated by "humane reasons
and for reasons of public interest."'20 There are no further guidelines,
either in the Act itself or in the legislative history, which manifest
Congressional intent.
In delegating its authority Congress "may choose such agencies
as it pleases to carry out whatever policy or rule of exclusion it may
adopt, and, so long as such agencies do not transcend limits of authority
or abuse discretion reposed in them, their judgment is not open to
challenge or review by courts." 2 ' However, section 212 does not make
clear what these limits of authority are, and it thus presents a need
for judicial interpretation.
The Administrative Procedure Act established a system of judicial review which could be applied to lessen the dangers of overly broad
discretion present in the Immigration and Nationality Act. 22 A court
15. Immigration Act § 1182(a) (28) (D),(G) (v) (1970).
16. Id. § 1182(d)(3).
17. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 1654 (1952)

(emphasis

added).

18. The term aggrieved relates to the question of standing and raises serious problems in definition generally beyond the scope of this note.
19. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. J 702 (1970).
20.
21.
22.
gave his

U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nnws, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1706 (1952).
Id. at 1654.
The dangers inherent in this statute led to its veto by President Truman, who
reasons inter alia:
Heretofore, for the most part, deportation and exclusion have rested upon
findings of fact made upon evidence. Under this bill, they would rest in many
instances upon the "opinion" or "satisfaction" of immigration or consular employees. The change from objective findings to subjective feelings is not com-
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is permitted to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action... found to
be . .. arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law." 23 There are numerous cases in which the
Court has recognized the need to limit statutorily unfettered discretion
even, and perhaps most necessarily, in areas where the courts have traditionally been most reluctant to interfere.24 Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in the instant case identifies the Court's responsibility to construe
the words "in the discretion of the Attorney General"2 5 as something
less than discretion to "pick and choose" at will. The Attorney General, like the Secretary of State, is given discretion only in matters within
26
his competence and area of legitimate concern.
In the instant case, plaintiffs asserted their first amendment right
to hear,27 receive, and appraise information in order to preserve the
principal value of a free flow of ideas. Plaintiffs contended that the application of the statute preempted this right by the exclusion of Mandel
where no legitimate purpose was served. 28 The district court considered
the case in terms of standard first amendment concepts and found that
the substance of section 212 (a) (28) was to "[restrain] the entry of
disfavored political doctrine."'2 9 Under this interpretation, the statutory
purpose itself was invalid, regardless of whether exclusion of aliens
provided a legitimate means to that end. In refusing to apply the long
line of Supreme Court alien exclusion decisions, the lower court accepted an argument similar to the one which the Supreme Court had
patible with our system of justice. The result would be to restrict or eliminate
judicial review of unlawful administrative action.
President's Veto Message to Congress, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 925 (1952).
The Act was passed over the President's veto, with the wording of the relevant sections

unchanged.
23. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970).
24. Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys., 393 U.S. 233 (1968); United States v. Robel,

389 U.S. 258 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
25. Immigration Act § 1182(d) (3).

26. Instant case at 2587 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
27. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), described a right protected

by the first amendment as "the right of the individual householder to determine
whether he is willing to receive [a] message." Id. at 143. The concept was enforced by
the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969): "It is the

right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other
ideas and experiences which is crucial here." That such a right exists is not questioned

by the Court in the instant case, and the injury to that right was the basis for plaintiffs'
claim of standing to sue. There was no claim that Mandel himself had a protected right
to speak in the United States, but only that the other plaintiffs had a right to hear
and meet with him.
28. Brief for Appellees at 14.
29. Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620, 626 (E.D.NY. 1971).
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rejected in United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams.8 0 In that case, the
Court rejected appellants' argument that the first amendment inhibits
the actual competency of Congress to pass laws abridging a Constitutional right, whether the law applies to citizens or aliens.8 1 By adopting
this line of reasoning and employing considerations of separation of
powers, the lower court failed to deal with the questions actually presented by the case: the narrower and more crucial issues of due process
safeguards and judicial standards in the statutory grant of discretion.
The plaintiffs' argument on appeal did not suggest as extreme a result as did the reasoning of the district court. The issue was presented
not in terms of invalidation of the statute, but as a problem of construction. 32 The fact that the statute permitted a waiver of otherwise
automatic exclusion was interpreted by plaintiffs as an indication that
Congress intended the Attorney General to consider infringement of
rights in relation to public interest each time a waiver was recommended. Thus, the Attorney General's alleged failure to balance these
interests would make his action subject to invalidation or, more accurately, to judicial review, under the arbitrary and abuse of discretion standards of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The Government stated the problem as one of a straightforward
delegation of power, and concluded that the exercise of that power
should be free of judicial review. It claimed that the statute grants the
Attorney General discretion as a part of the executive's established area
of control. Since the restriction concerns only the act of entering the
country, it cannot be said to restrict the freedom to receive information. The Court rejected this argument, noting that the restriction of
that freedom can be significant even though it results from a mode
83
of regulation which happens to be physical.
Although the Supreme Court suggested that a first amendment
right was involved, the majority felt that the decisive issue was one of
judicial policy. Their extreme statement of the issue expresses the practical nature of their concern: "[T]he case ...comes down to the narrow
issue whether the First Amendment confers upon the appellee professors ... the ability to determine that Mandel should be permitted to
enter the country or, in other words, to compel the Attorney General
30.
31.
an alien.
32.
33.

194 U.S. 279 (1904).
Id. at 289. Turner, unlike the instant case, concerned the assertion of rights by
Brief for Appellees at 27.
Instant case at 764.
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to allow Mandel's admission."8 4 The majority reasoned that if every
claim denied by the Attorney General were brought to the courts, it
would require a weighing of interests in each case, with each court inventing its own standard. 35 The traditional judicial attitude toward
executive control of alien regulation is based on the assumption that
Congress intended the Attorney General, not the courts, to develop
that standard. The Court refused to examine the reason given by the
Attorney General, indicating that any criteria chosen by the executive, so long as it was "facially legitimate and bona fide,"' 38 would not be
questioned judicially.
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, considered the harmful effect of

the majority position and examined the Court's responsibility more
fully. In his view, the Court should "construe the Act generously by
[the] First Amendment standard,"ST a process which would greatly limit
the number of cases in which a waiver could be denied. Furthermore
they should apply the general principle of judicial review in matters
of administrative discretion: authority must not extend beyond the
official's expertise. 88 Discretion would be limited here because the Secretary of State recommended a waiver, eliminating further consideration
of foreign policy. The Attorney General, when acting beyond this
authority, serves as a censor, a role dearly not intended by Congress,
and plainly not acceptable by first amendment standards. Mr. Justice
Douglas' view requires a judicial examination of the reason for the exclusion, and would thus have the broad discretion under the statute
defined, in part, judicially.
Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, strongly
opposed the majority's decision and its resulting threat, as they perceived it, to the freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment. 39 Refusal
of the waiver, with its consequent harm to plaintiffs, can only be justified if it is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest.
Unable to meet this test, the majority devised the "facially legitimate
34. Id. at 762.
35. Id. at 769-70.
36. Id.

37. Id. at 772 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38. "The discretion entrusted to [the Attorney General here] concerns matters
commonly within the competence of the Department of Justice-national security,
importation of drugs, and the like." Id. at 774 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
39. "[The exclusion] has directly prevented the free interchange of ideas guaranteed by the First Amendment," and has thus interfered with rights guaranteed to
the appellees and to the general public who have an "interest in the prevention of any
stifling of political utterance." Id. at 776.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

and bona fide" standard, a standard which Mr. Justice Marshall found
unprecedented and unjustified. 40 The Attorney General's reason for
refusing the waiver did not appear to be supported by facts in the record, yet the majority found it sufficient to outweigh the first amendment interference. Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent went still further,
reaching the constitutionality of the basic exclusionary power under
section 212 (a) (28). He agreed with the district court's conclusion that
"Mandel's exclusion is not incident to a legitimate regulatory objective, but is based directly on the subject matter of his beliefs."4 1 The
government claimed that its objective was the exclusion of aliens, and
that its power was therefore broader than in other areas. However, because the majority failed to distinguish this case by its involvement of
citizens' rights, it overestimated the extent of the exclusion power. In
Marshall's view, Mandel could not be excluded constitutionally without the government showing a compelling national interest. 42 If evidence showing some arguable danger to national security had been
offered the result could have been justified, but punishment and exclusion of ideas are not compelling interests.
The majority has taken a position in this case which it would
probably characterize as one of judicial restraint. In actuality it expands the authority of the executive in an area where the statute provides all too few procedural safeguards. The statutory scheme is constitutional on its face and, if applied with due regard for the protection of rights, serves the legitimate purpose of excluding a class of
persons that Congress thought harmful. Plaintiffs' basic claim should
not have been that the statute was invalidated by the first amendment, but rather that the denial of the waiver was an abuse of discretion, and therefore a violation of due process.
There is no question that Congress can authorize the Attorney
General to exclude individuals, but it is also clear that the Court has
power to limit his authority to an appropriate effectuation of the purpose of the statute. The Court's responsibility is to devise a judicial
standard, through judicial review of the Attorney General's actions,
which will determine what criteria are appropriate, and what actions
constitute an abuse of authority. There are ample precedents for judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, regardless of
40. Id. at 777.
41. Id. at 781.
42. Id.
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whether the complaint is based on an infringement of first amendment
rights; or of any other rights. Categorizing this as an immigration case
does not destroy the requirement for judicial review, nor does it affect
the Court's power to limit discretion. 43 Congressional delegation of
authority to regulate immigration does not remove the power of review. The Court's refusal to consider the facts supporting the Attorney
General's action was more serious than a refusal to engage in the balancing process required if the case had indeed presented a first amendment issue. It was an avoidance of the real issue, and of the necessity to
decide the case by judicial review under the abuse of authority and
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. In considering the adequacy of
the reason for denial of the waiver of ineligibility, the Court could
have established guidelines which at present are completely lacking.
The government should have been required to prove the legality of its
reason. If it were arbitrary, 44 or for an unacceptable purpose such as
punishment, and if plaintiffs were thereby aggrieved, the action should
have been invalidated by the Court. Without a firm basis of proof in
the record, the Court nevertheless accepted the reason of the Attorney
General as being "facially legitimate and bona fide," a standard which
may well mean, in practice, any or no reason. The phrase will undoubtedly prove sufficiently vague to allow the virtually unfettered
discretion which the majority claimed not to support in its opinion,
thus giving an administrative official the power, under the guise of
judicial restraint, to determine who American citizens will be unable
to hear.4 5
The effect of this decision is that the Attorney General can increase the already serious restrictions on American intellectual development. 4 The political branches of the government are given increased control with which they can interfere with citizens' rights with
47
virtually no interference from the Court.
43. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
44. Mr. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, calls the reason given "a sham." Instant
case at 778.
45. Id. at 770. The Court neither accepted nor rejected the Attorney General's
claim to absolute discretion to grant or deny a waiver of ineligibility here. Rather, the
question was expressly left open. Id.
46. Comment, Opening the Floodgates to Dissident Aliens, 6 IHAv. Cirv. 1UGHTSCiv. LIm. L. REv. 141, 143-51 (1970).
47. The State Department has indicated a change from the policy of the 1960's:
since 1969 those aliens included under (a) (28) who are "active in leftist student organizations or invited to speak at highly publicized meetings sponsored by leftist brganizations are more likely than in the past to be refused a waiver." Interview with Frederick
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The majority's position is perhaps based on the conviction that the
Court should not engage in a case-by-case analysis when an executive
body has .been delegated that task. By formulating a more realistic
standard, or by placing some real limitations on the executive discretion, they would have accomplished the same result without denying
the Court's own authority. The Attorney General, after this decision,
is free to pursue virtually any policy he chooses, and can expect neither
guidelines nor criticism from the Court.
SUSAN GINSBERG
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THAT
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THE PROCEDURAL

SAFEGUARDS

EMPLOYED IN OBTAINING

THAT CON-

FINEMENT.

We'd like to know
A little bit about you
For our files.
We'd like to help you learn
To help yourself.
Look aroundyou. All you see
Are sympathetic eyes.
Stroll around the grounds
Untilyou feel at home.
Paul Simon, "Mrs. Robinson"
In July 1966, Edward McNeil was sentenced to five years in a
Maryland prison after having been convicted on two charges of assault. Prior to his actual imprisonment, the trial judge made an
ex parte determination that there was reasonable cause to suspect
that McNeil was a defective delinquent.1 As a result, he was comSmith, Jr., Deputy Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department
of State, Feb. 7, 1972, in Developments in the Laz--The National Security Interest
and Civil Liberties, 85 HAav. L. REv. 1153 n.97. It may be anticipated that any further

changes in policy will be unreviewable, regardless of their effect on first amendment
rights.
1. A defective delinquent is defined as:

an individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated antisocial
or criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity, and who
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